Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, head of Iran’s National Cyberspace Center and secretary of the Supreme Cyberspace Council, said Iran became the first country to disable Starlink terminals during a domestic blackout. He made the statement at a conference on online businesses organized by Iran’s cyber police. He said Iran used a specific technology to disrupt the terminals and possessed additional systems capable of identifying or preventing their use, but he did not name the technology. Iranian authorities framed the January protests as a “coup,” a characterization that belongs to Tehran, not to the public record.
What the Evidence Actually Shows
A European cybersecurity assessment points toward signal interference, not a confirmed remote shutdown.
A European cybersecurity assessment reported that Iranian authorities likely used sophisticated military jamming equipment, with uplink and downlink traffic affected by as much as 80%, according to cert.europa.eu. That word “likely” is doing real work. Broad-area jamming that makes a network unusable across affected zones is a very different technical achievement than disabling tens of thousands of terminals, many of which Reuters reported may have been smuggled into the country through unofficial channels. Whether Iran used software compromise, terminal geolocation, or broad spectrum interference remains unverified by the sources reviewed.
Why the Distinction Matters
If Iran’s claim holds even partially, electronic warfare against commercial satellite internet has moved from theoretical risk to active design requirement.
Aghamiri said, “If satellite internet infrastructure is used as a tool of war, naturally this infrastructure can become a legitimate military target,” according to Iran International. Satellite providers need to treat that statement as a signal of intent, even while scrutinizing it. Anti-jamming investment, stronger terminal authentication, and clear crisis protocols are now urgent priorities for operators serving users in authoritarian states. Iranian users holding unauthorized Starlink terminals already risked arrest on top of degraded service, illustrating how quickly consequences compound when a government designates a technology as a threat, as demonstrated by how a surveillance app can be deployed to monitor and suppress dissent.
What still needs answering: the precise method Iran used, the actual number of terminals affected, and whether Tehran acted alone. The EU assessment noted possible foreign support for jamming capability without confirming it. Until independent verification arrives, Iran’s claim remains an official assertion, not an established technical fact, and satellite operators cannot afford to wait for that distinction to be resolved on their behalf.
