Your phone automatically searches for the nearest available signal and connects to it. FalcoNet counts on exactly that behavior. The NYPD is seeking public comment on a proposed three-year sole-source contract with Cognyte Technology Inc. for the FalcoNet mobile cell-site simulator system, covering hardware, software, training, warranty, and support. The contract is not yet finalized.
What FalcoNet Actually Does
The device mimics a legitimate cell tower, capturing identifiers from phones that connect to it before police can narrow in on a target’s location.
FalcoNet impersonates a real cell tower, and nearby phones connect to it as a result. The system then captures device identifiers and helps investigators determine relative signal strength and general direction toward a device. It does not produce GPS-level location data.
That capability is not the same as reading your texts or listening to your calls. NYPD officials told the NY Daily News that FalcoNet will not be used to intercept calls or collect information such as text messages from phones not involved in an investigation. The system is portable: it can ride on a police vehicle, mount on a drone, or travel in a backpack. Cognyte’s specific AI capabilities within FalcoNet remain incompletely documented in public materials, in part because the NYPD’s February 2026 policy quietly removed a prior statement that cell-site simulators do not use artificial intelligence or machine learning.
The Safeguards on Paper
The NYPD’s published policy requires a warrant in most cases, but carved-out exceptions and restricted access rules define the operational limits.
Under the department’s published impact-and-use policy, investigators must obtain a judge-issued search warrant supported by probable cause before deploying a cell-site simulator in most cases. Exigent circumstances involving an immediate danger of serious injury or death allow pre-warrant use, with a retroactive warrant generally required within 48 hours. No warrant is needed at all to locate a missing or suicidal person.
Operation is restricted to four TARU members running the system through laptops on a closed, stand-alone network. NYPD officials pointed to a February rescue of a 15-year-old girl abducted from a Queens group home as an example of what rapid phone-location capability can accomplish. The reference is to phone-tracking technology generally, and no source confirms that FalcoNet itself was involved in that case.
The written framework sounds reasonable on paper. The gap between what a policy promises and what anyone outside the department can independently confirm is where the real problem begins.
Before the NYPD had a written cell-site-simulator policy or any warrant requirement, it used the technology more than 1,000 times, according to reporting by the NY Daily News. That history is precisely why advocacy groups are treating current assurances as a starting point rather than a conclusion.
The New York Civil Liberties Union raised concerns that cell-site simulators can capture identifying data from phones belonging to people who are not investigative targets. That concern compounds another: the Legal Aid Society’s Digital Forensics Unit noted that written restrictions on content collection cannot be independently verified without audit records or external review. The Surveillance Technology Oversight Project pointed out that the NYPD does not report cell-site-simulator use on a case-by-case basis, even though it publishes reports on drone deployments. That asymmetry makes it difficult to assess whom the department targets or whether its own policies are followed.
Cognyte did not respond to requests for comment, according to the NY Daily News. Human-rights organizations have previously raised concerns about Cognyte products being sold to governments accused of targeting dissidents and political opponents. Those allegations are attributed, not adjudicated.
Before this contract is approved, the NYPD should commit to aggregate or case-level usage reports, clear data-retention and deletion rules, and a credible path toward independent audits. Warrant requirements and TARU-only access are a floor, not a ceiling. The standard for deploying AI-assisted surveillance across one of the world’s densest cities should be transparency that the public can actually measure.
